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Abstract
Terrorist attacks carried out by individuals or single cells have significantly accelerated over the last 20
years. This type of terrorism, defined as lone-actor (LA) terrorism, stands as one of the greatest security
threats of our time. Research on LA behavior and characteristics has emerged and accelerated over
the last decade. While these studies have produced valuable information on demographics, behavior,
classifications, and warning signs, the relationship among these characters are yet to be addressed.
Moreover, the means of radicalization and attacking have changed over decades. This study first identifies
25 binary behavioral characteristics of LAs and analyzes 192 LAs recorded on three different databases.
Next, the classification is carried out according to first ideology, then to incident scene behavior via a
virtual attacker-defender game, and, finally, according to the clusters obtained from the data. In addition,
within each class, statistically significant associations and temporal relations are extracted using the A-
priori algorithm. These associations would be instrumental in identifying the attacker type and intervene
at the right time. The results indicate that while pre-9/11 LAs were mostly radicalized by the people in
their environment, post-9/11 LAs are more diverse. Furthermore, the association chains for different LA
types present unique characteristic pathways to violence and after-attack behavior.
Keywords: lone-actor terrorism, association rule mining, the A-priori algorithm, R-rules, temporal
associations
1 Introduction
Terrorism is defined as an act of aggression or violence against noncombatants with the objective of
affecting policy makers indirectly by intimidating the target audience [1]. Terrorist threat does not arise
∗This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant No.1901721)
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from a desire for financial gain or mere personal vengeance; there is a higher political, ideological or
religious motivation [2]. Partly due to the success in counterterrorism efforts, the face of terrorism has
changed dramatically in recent years. Attacks by groups with defined chains of command have declined,
as the prevalence of autonomous cells and individuals has grown. The core focus of this paper, lone actor
(LA) terrorism has increased by 134% over the last 20 years [1]. Recent examples include the 2017 Las
Vegas mass shooting of concertgoers [3] and the 2019 El Paso shooting in a supermarket [4].
Even though the definition of “LA terrorism” is open to discussion, particularly regarding whether
dyads or triads, and members of extremist/terrorist organizations should be included [2, 5], existing
literature largely agrees on several characteristics. Spaaij [2] argues that LA attacks are consequences of
a personal grudge channeled into a higher cause. As a result, personal and ideological motivations may
not be entirely distinguishable. Moreover, LA attacks are rarely impulsive or sudden [5] and LAs are not
as well-organized as terrorist groups, hence, an intended attack preparation usually takes longer than an
attack by terrorist groups [6]. Finally, LAs may align themselves with extreme movements [7]; in fact,
they mostly appear to be too extremist even for terrorist organizations [8]. The literature also agrees that
LA attacks differ from common crime or other assassinations by involving an ulterior political, religious
or other ideological component [6]; they often come up with their own ideologies that is a mixture of
personal vendettas and ideological grievances. In the following subsections, we preview the common
characteristics, and‘ classification structures of LAs and review the prior work on quantitative analyses
in this field.
1.1 Characteristics and Detection Challenges of LAs
When investigating the characteristics of LAs, the research focuses on demographic, economic, and
psychographic characteristics. These characteristics are composed of (i) certain events or incidents that
might cause radicalization, (ii) observable actions an LA might commit, and (iii) the environmental
response to these observable actions. Some of these characteristics involve events prior to an attack
intent, such as having relations with extremist people or mental illness leading to radicalization [9]. Some
events or incidents may provoke the idea of an attack and act as a triggering mechanism that can range
from a personal hardship such as being fired from a job to a mass incident such as an international conflict
between governments [8, 10, 11]. Other behavioral characteristics involve details in attack planning such
as the target or weapon selection.
Distinguishing LAs from people with extremist ideological views constitutes a challenge as the ma-
jority of people with extremist ideological views do not pose a security threat [8]. In that context,
McCauley and Moskalenko [12] proposed two radicalization pyramids, one of opinions and one of actions.
The “opinion radicalization pyramid” has a range from “neutral” to “ideology as a moral obligation”
and the “action radicalization pyramid” has a range from “inert” to “terrorist”. According to this study,
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there is a jump even between the pinnacle of the opinion pyramid (defending ideology as a moral obli-
gation) and the radical action, and this transition is not inevitable. However, the authors also conclude
that not all LAs need to climb the opinion pyramid before committing an attack; it is a matter of
opportunity rather than an obligation [12]. A more extensive behavioral study conducted by Meloy et
al. [9] defined eight “proximal warning behaviors” for an LA attack. It is essential to have a “pathway
behavior” from grievance to attack. An LA fixates on a target or an ideology more intensely over time
and identifies himself with the cause or a role model. LAs may leak their intent directly or indirectly
throughout their pathway. An attack requires familiarity with weapons; hence, they conduct dry runs
to test their abilities. Before an attack, there is an “energy burst” indicating that the settlements and
preparations for the attack have started. Occasionally, LAs directly threaten the target and they may
also hint that the attack is their only option or “last resort”. These “proximal warning behaviors” can,
then, be used in the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), which is a professional
LA risk-assessment framework [13]. Beside these “proximal warning behaviors”, TRAP-18 involves 10
“distal characteristics”. These distal characteristics are a) having a personal grievance and moral outage;
b) having been framed by an ideology; c) failing to affiliate with an extremist group; d) depending on
virtual communities; e) thwarting of occupational goals; f) changes in thinking and emotion; g) failing
of sexual-intimate pairing; h) having a mental disorder; i) being creative and innovative; j) having a
criminal violence history [13].
Some of these elements are difficult to trace in real life; most physical moves of an LA are hardly
traceable. Moreover, conventional attack prevention techniques, such as infiltration or wiretapping, are
not effective for LA attacks due to the absence of a group [6]. The silver lining in LA detection is that
they are commonly radicalized by Internet exchanges; and, therefore leave their “writeprints” [6, 9].
They spread their views and opinions before committing an actual attack [6]. The biggest challenge of
detecting an LA online is that search engines cannot access to the “deep web” in which such exchanges
often take place.
1.2 Classification of LAs
Although, LAs have some commonalities such as acting alone or having fixated on an ideology, their
behaviors along the pathway to violence may vary among different attacker types. Consequently, the
existing literature proposes different classification domains for LAs. Some examples of these domains are
location, purpose, type of target, goals, and “role in protection” [14].
Pantucci [7] categorized LAs as the loner, the lone wolf, the lone wolf pack, and the lone attacker
depending on the number of people involved and the existence of a chain of command. Bates et al.’s
classification used four dimensions to group LAs: degree of self-radicalization, risk-awareness level of
the LA, altruistic motivation, and the number of attacks intended [14]. Gill et al. [5] classified LAs in
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terms of their ideologies: right-wing, islamists, and single issue. They argued that even though LAs as
a whole do not have any distinguishing characteristics except mostly being males, subgroups have very
noticeable characteristics in terms of demographics, network connectivity and operational success. This
ideology-based classification was commonly applied in literature. Meloy and Gill [15] applied statistical
analyses that compared three ideological groups in terms of their distal characteristics and warning
behaviors. They found out that right-wing LAs are less fixated on their ideologies, single-issue LAs are
less dependent on virtual communities. Sawyer and Hienz [16] included far-left and hybrid (combination
of different ideologies) to their classification, albeit they were less in number compared to the three main
ideological groups.
1.3 Quantitative Approaches for LA Terrorism
Meaningful statistical analyses over LAs are difficult to conduct since LA attacks are black-swan events
that are rare even in extremist ideologies, which makes them impossible to label, let alone forecasted [8].
Similarly, commonly applied terrorist social network analysis methods fail due to the absence of a group
network [17, 18]. However, with the help of social media and online forums, identification, leakage
and fixation are traceable online. Brynielsson et al. [6] extracted the attack intent of an LA through
text mining. Intent appears as an important indicator of an attack in the economic analysis of an LA
attack [1, 2]. Phillips [1] implemented a quantitative model that shows a decrease in the probability
of an attack in case of higher-level of security (the deterrence effect) but an increase in the probability
of an improvised attack plan by momentarily switching the target (the substitute effect). In addition,
he modeled the increase in the probability of an attack with the increased financial resources of the
attacker (the endowment effect) and embedded the risk-averse/risk-seeking behavior of the attacker in
the model (the preference effect) in a game-theoretical scheme. Gordon et al. [19] worked on weights
of different criteria in the intent of an attacker. They also implemented a Delphi Method, in which
a facilitator gathers expert opinions anonymously with the sole purpose of arriving to a consensus by
supplying recursive feedback.
Most quantitative studies on LA behavior are composed of summary statistics and hypothesis tests
over LA demographics and behavior. A recent study by Philips (2017) compares the USA and other 15
developed countries in terms of casualties and demonstrates that LA attacks are deadly threats especially
in the United States. Schuurman et al. [20] analyzed the LA cases in North America and Europe between
1985-2015 and provided striking results. They found that over 80% of LA attacks on American targets
between 1999 and 2009 were prevented by the attention of law enforcement or the general public such as
neighborhood watches. According to their data, 46% of LAs had shown violent behavior, 62% of them
had contacts with radical, extremists people or terrorists and 31% were well-known members of these
groups. 86% of LAs communicated their attack-related ideas via oral communication or social media
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leakage. Ellis et al. [21] found that weapons training increases the number of casualties per attack from
an average of 1.47 to 2.29. A study by Gill et al. [5] used hypothesis testing and showed that LAs
do not have a defining characteristic as a whole but that the subgroups of right-wing, single issue and
jihadist terrorists have their own demographics and network structures. Even within the same subgoup
the weapon choice, and the attack preparation of an LA may present different casualty outcomes. Thus
it is clear that although ideology-based classification leads up to common demographic characteristics [5],
it may not necessarily provide commonalities in terms of behavioral characteristics or responses.
Another challenge for behavioral analyses is that the term “behavior” have different scopes in lit-
erature. Besides, the terms “terrorist behavior” or “attacker behavior” can refer to different concepts.
In some studies, the term involves attack-related behavior such as identification or fixation [6], while in
some others, “behavior” refers to the response, mood or observable actions of a terrorist [22].
These studies indicate that while knowledge on LA definition, typology, and demographics is available
to a certain extent, relationships among these characteristics are yet to be discovered. This paper intends
to address this problem and makes the following contributions to the literature:
• Provides clarification on the “behavior” term with a temporal perspective.
• Identifies 25 binary attributes for LA characteristics based on the data prepared by Hamm and
Spaaij [23].
• Defines behavior-based attacker types using these binary attributes.
• Compares pre-9/11 LAs to post-9/11 LAs to reflect the temporal changes in LA terrorism.
• Analyzes the implications among LA behaviors for each type.
• Forms chain rules that sum up the evolution process of each attacker type.
• Extracts temporal relations between LA behavior milestones for each type.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides detailed information on the means of LA
data gathering and processing, the identification of 25 attributes for LA characteristics, and various LA
classification schemes. Section 3 introduces the A-priori algorithm, describes its statistical properties and
the rule-chain-formation procedure. Section 4.1 provides associations for the pooled database, and Section
4.2 compares pre- and post-9/11 era to demonstrate how LA terrorism has changed through decades.
Section 4.3 introduces LA types based on three classification schemes: i) ideology-based, ii) incident-
scene-based, and iii) behavioral-based. Section 5 forms behavioral and chronological association chains
of LAs for each type. Section 6 demonstrates the temporal relationship among observable landmarks on
the attack pathway. The concluding remarks follow in the last section.
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2 LA Characteristics, Behavior, Data, and Classifications
2.1 Data for LA Behavior and Characteristics
The National Criminal Justice Reference System database prepared by Hamm and Spaaij [23] involves
98 LA attacks in the USA between 1940-2013. This dataset can be used to obtain data on LA behavior
and attack characteristics. While providing extremely valuable data, the database lacks the recent data
on LA attacks, given the fact that LA terrorism has been on the rise especially over the last decade.
However, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [24] holds the records of all terrorist events worldwide
and the Mother Jones database [25] holds the records of all mass shootings in the USA. The GTD records
the data of attacks until the end of 2017, and it identifies 192 incidents in the USA between 2014-2017.
However, these incidents do not only involve LA attacks; they also involve attacks claimed by terrorist
groups, and unclaimed or unresolved attacks. Similarly, The Mother Jones database contains all mass
shootings whose overwhelming majority involve a single perpetrator; however, not all shootings by a
single person are categorized as LA terrorism. The following filter is used to distinguish LAs from other
terrorist attacks in the GTD and other mass shootings in the Mother Jones database.
• For the GTD, the attacks should be planned and committed by a single person or two-person cells
(dyads). These two-person cells will be evaluated separately for each attacker since they have been
observed to exhibit different behaviors and have been provoked by different environmental responses
even for the same incident.
• In the GTD, all unclaimed and unresolved attacks are excluded, since these attacks do not provide
any data for the attacker’s characteristics.
• For the Mother Jones database, the motivations of attackers are checked, and violence stemming
solely from a personal grievance are excluded. However, for the sake of further research, we should
note that bullying-related attacks have recently been discussed for inclusion as a part of single-issue
events [26].
In the GTD, 70 of the 196 attacks are unclaimed or unresolved, and 84 of the attacks are identified
as LA attacks. In the Mother Jones Database, 17 out of 44 mass shootings satisfy the criteria of being
committed by a single person and stemming from an ideology-based grievance. 9 of those mass shootings
match with the records of the GTD. In total, data for 190 LAs have been obtained using these three
databases.
Using the National Criminal Justice Reference System database as a template, we have gathered data
on the following characteristics of the attackers:
• Demographic and socio-economic data: age, race, gender, marital status, mental health history,
employment status and military history.
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• Distal characteristics: criminal history, relation to radical groups, means of radicalization.
• Proximal warning behaviors: triggering event and leakage.
• Attack decisions: Target and weapon selection
• Attack consequences: fatalities and after-attack behavior.
The distinction between “distal characteristics” and “proximal warning behaviors” in [13, 15] is
that the distal characteristics belong to the history of an LA before the attack idea and preparations.
“Proximal warning behaviors” start with “pathway to violence” provoked by an ideological and personal
grievance. It can be observed that the distal characteristics or proximal warning behaviors we employ do
not match one-to-one to [13], since our data do not specify the warning behaviors such as “last resort”,
“energy burst” or “directly communicated threat”. Using the available data, the distal characteristics
are selected in a way to maximize their relevance to radicalization and violence.
Our data involves four female LAs (two in the pre-9/11 era, two in the post-9/11 era); which is a
very small number among all LAs. Hence, any gender-based analysis on LAs would lack sufficient data.
Three pre-9/11-era LAs have chosen terrorism as a career and committed multiple attacks over a decade.
Excluding these three LAs, the average age of attackers is 35.11 with a standard deviation of 13.73 and
a median of 31. The ages range from 15 to 88. Observations from the data indicate that sudden changes
in marital status, mental health history, employment status, and military history serve as a triggering
event. In fact, the three most common personal triggering events are separation from partner, losing
job or student status, and emergence of mental or physical health issues. While we acknowledge that
these factors contribute to radicalism and violence, socio-economic and demographic characteristics may
be related to an attack in a proximal or distal way. Hence, we embed some of the socio-economic or
demographic data into distal and proximal characteristics. However, we try to avoid using demographic
and socio-economic data directly in our behavioral characterization for the sake of fairness.
Through the resources [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27], we construct the following exhaustive list of
behaviors by breaking down the rest of the data into 25 binary exhaustive characteristics.
• Criminal history before the attack
1. No criminal history
2. One offense
3. Multiple offenses
• Knowledge of weapons
4. Had formal weaponry training
• Relation to radical groups
5. No prior relations with any extremist groups
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6. Has contacts with an extremist or a terrorist group/people
• Means of radicalization
7. Self-radicalized
8. Was not self radicalized
• Triggering event
9. A triggering event caused the attack idea
10. No particular triggering event, radicalized incrementally by the socio-political atmosphere
• Leakage
11. No leakage was made
12. Leakage was made offline
13. Leakage was made online
• Targets
14. Civilians
15. Person symbolizing the enemy ideology (politician, religious leader, abortion doctor, etc.)
16. Law enforcement (military, police, etc.) or government officials
17. No targets aimed / symbolic attack
• Means of attack
18. Firearms
19. Other weapons
• Fatalities
20. No fatalities or injuries
21. Only injuries but no fatalities
22. At least one fatality
• After-attack behavior
23. Was able to escape the crime scene
24. Surrendered / was arrested at the crime scene
25. Committed suicide / was killed at the crime scene
As aforementioned, the existing literature handles the term “behavior” differently. In our study, the
term “behavior” is defined as the observable actions of the LA [28]. Hence, to provide semantic clarity,
we first introduce the following temporal terminology on attacker behavior:
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Early behavior and characteristics: These behaviors and characteristics do not affect the attack
directly; they are behaviors or responses before the idea of an attack emerges. The radicalization process
is involved in this section. Examples are prior criminal history, childhood abuse, employment status.
In some cases, a triggering event is included in this phase which is a mostly personal grievance that
results with the attack idea. In other cases, incremental radicalization causes the attack idea without
requiring any triggering incidents. Distal characteristics in the TRAP 18 framework [13] are among the
early behavior and characteristics.
Preparatory and precursor behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristics
are the activities or responses that comes with the attack idea such as acquiring or transporting weaponry,
leaking intent, capability testing through dry-runs, meetings and other communications, committing
fraud to travel to attack locations, etc. Proximal behaviors in the TRAP 18 framework [13] are among
the preparatory and precursor behavior and characteristics.
Incident-scene behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristics are the
activities at the incident scene prior to the attack. Examples include following an abnormal trajectory,
counter-surveillance related or cycling behavior, wearing suspicious clothing (a trench coat on a 95-
degree day, sunglasses on a rainy day, etc.). Incident-scene behavior is analyzed under abnormal or
unusual trajectory. Inevitably, information at this detail is not available publicly or in literature, since
attacks are either limitedly or partially caught on grainy security footage or not caught at all.
After-attack behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristicss involve the
behavior of the terrorist right after the attack. Some examples include escaping the scene, committing
suicide. The available literature mostly focuses on early, preparatory and after-attack behavior [6, 8].
The first 8 characteristics in the list involve the attacker’s early behavior and characteristics. In this
period, having prior criminal records and formal weaponry training are factors that are found to increase
the number of casualties [29]. In fact, Capellan et al. [30] emphasized that some LAs enroll in the formal
weaponry training units just to enhance their attack capabilities. The locus of radicalization also differs
among attackers. An LA, who is responsible for 16 bank robberies and two bombings, was radicalized
by his parents since childhood, while another one was a member of Al-Qaeda. Therefore, while some
LAs have prior contacts to extremist or terrorist organizations; others have no connections to radical
organizations but to radical people. Furthermore, some LAs do not have connections to even radical
people, they are radicalized by their own “gaslighting”. For example, another LA opened fire to Family
Research Council headquarters in 2013, initiated his radicalization process by himself through biased
research from various websites. The means of radicalization characteristic distinguishes LAs as being
initiated to radicalization by other people or by their own effort.
The attack decision may or may not stem from a triggering event. The triggering event can be
personal such as being fired from a job, or social events such as 9/11-attacks [23]. While some LAs do
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not require a triggering event but are radicalized by incremental and cumulative life experiences, some
others require being triggered multiple times in order to develop the attack intent. In our database, 99
out of 152 LAs have certain triggering events initiating the attack idea. Out of these 99 LAs, 67 of them
were triggered by a personal event. Two of these LAs were triggered by multiple personal events. 30
LAs were triggered by a social event. Two LAs were triggered both by a social and a personal event.
Personal trigger events are broken down as in Table 1.
Personal Event Frequency
Separating from partner/wife/family 13
Losing job or dropping out of school 10
Mental/physical health problems 8
Arrest-related issues 6
News / poster / graffiti / newspaper irritation 5
Sting operations 5
Rejection by friends / colleagues / other people 4
Financial or social security problems 3
Eviction / homelessness 3
Fight with neighbors 3
Denied applications 2
Deployment as an army member 2
Travel 2
Online discussions 1
Unreturned calls 1
Gaslighted by partner 1
Table 1: Personal Trigger Events and Their Frequencies
Leakage is also a common trait of attackers; many LAs leak their intent before the actual attack. One
extreme case belongs to an LA who posted a 1500-page manifestation on social media the night before
the attack [6]. These leaks can be offline through chats, letters, etc.; or online through social media,
e-mails, etc. Our definition of online leakage involves the cases where the LA benefits from the Internet
to broadcast attack intent; hence, phone calls or television broadcasts are considered as offline.
Target selection is another attack characteristic and the targets are civilians in most attacks. However,
if the LA fixates on a person that symbolizes the enemy ideology; the attacker may choose to spare other
civilians. The target can also be the security forces, military, or a formal government official on duty [31].
Most LA attacks are conducted with firearms which are shown to be more deadly [29]. Other weapons
include explosives, blades, bodily weapons (hand, feet, etc.), or vehicles (trucks, cars, etc.).
2.2 LA Classification
Using 9/11 as a cutoff point for understanding recent exacerbation in terrorism, we first compare pre-9/11
and post-9/11 LAs to detect the changes in LA terrorism over time. Then, focusing on post-9/11 LAs,
we classify them in multiple domains. The first classification domain is offered by Gill et al. [5], that is,
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the ideological classification: jihadists, right-wing LAs, and single-issue LAs.
The second classification domain is clustering according to incident-scene behavior. However, incident-
scene visuals or data are not publicly available. Serious game design simulating real-world conditions
is a suitable surrogate and a widely-used approach for the resolution of such predicaments [32]. In the
absence of available data, at the Game Research for Information SecuriTy (GRIST) Lab 1 at Rutgers, we
have developed a 2D-game where players can imitate the trajectory and target selection of an attacker
or the strategy of a defender aiming to catch the attacker. The game considers the effect of human
dynamics and crowd flow on target selection. In this game, the attacker moves over a network and knows
the density of each adjacent node before he makes his selection to move to an adjacent node or stay at
the same node, or attack (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the defender patrols the network without
knowing the exact location of the attacker. If both players are at the same node, the defender detects
the attacker with some probability. Data from playthroughs are collected for each session.
Figure 1: Playable game developed in the GRIST Lab.
101 game sessions (15 two-people runs, 69 against greedy-AI and 17 against improved AI) are analyzed
using simple clustering tools (hierarchical clustering) and results are compared in order to select the best
features for clustering. In terms of the attacker, the important classifiers are determined as: i) time of
planting the bomb, ii) distance between the attacker and the defender, iii) node’s occupancy rank, and iv)
node’s centrality. In the clustering results, the occupancy rank of nodes has emerged as more important
than the actual population itself. According to these features, 5 types of attackers are extracted (Table
2): i) maximum damagers, ii) symbolic attackers, iii) daredevils, iv) attention seekers, and iv) stallers.
The maximum damagers follow the nodes to reach a node with the highest population, whereas
stallers tend to keep a spiral route and wait for an opportunity to attack a fixated target. Daredevils
stay close to the defenders in a risk-seeking manner.
The real-world counterparts of these LA types are derived from the correlations between game and
real-world data. Real-world maximum damagers aim to harm as many people as possible or conduct a
series of attacks. Real world symbolic attackers target a person or a leader that symbolizes the “enemy”
ideology or send a message without causing any harm by attacking fake weapons. Daredevils attack
1http://gursoy.rutgers.edu/GRIST/index.html
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Table 2: LA-types using incident-scene behavior obtained from the playable game.
directly security forces where being unsuccessful is highly likely or go on a killing spree without a plan;
whereas, attention seekers attack central locations at odd hours without intending heavy casualties.
Finally, stallers fixate on a location or a person, stalk the target, and plan the attack.
Finally, the third classification domain is in terms of behaviors. In order to obtain behavioral classes,
152 post-9/11 LAs are clustered by a K-Means algorithm. The best results are obtained with 7 clusters
with distinct characteristics. 3 of these clusters contain a small and insufficient number of LAs, and
hence, we will operate on the 4 clusters involving sufficient number of LAs.
3 Methodology
3.1 A-priori Algorithm
The A-priori algorithm was proposed by Agrawal and Srikant [33], and has been successfully applied
to many social problems. Nijkemp et al. [34] implemented it to identify the association rules for the
valuation of different biodiversity indicators and different kinds of habitats, while Parack et al. [35]
analyzed the relationship between grading system and attendance in an educational setting. A security-
based application of the A-priori algorithm is [36], which analyzed the relationship between different
classes of passengers and safety factors.
In this study, the A-priori algorithm is applied to extract the associations among behavioral and
attack characteristics. For LAs, an association rule of the form A→ B can be interpreted as “If behavior
A exists, then behavior B also exists”. A rule chain is of the form A→ B → C, meaning that “If behavior
A exists, then behavior B also exists. If Behavior B exists, then behavior C also exists.”. It should be
noted that association rules do not imply a cause-effect relationship; these rules state that given one
behavior, another behavior may also exists. Mathematical derivation of association rules are explained
12
and every mathematical formula is presented in Appendix A.
Let S be a set of d items, i.e. S = {s1, s2, . . . , sd}, and T be a set of n transactions in a database,
i.e. T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. A transaction involves at least one item. In the LA terrorism setting, the
transactions are LAs, and the items are one of the 25 binary characteristics. As we have constructed
the list of characteristics in an exhaustive manner, a given LA satisfies at least one condition on the list.
In our case, d = 25 representing each one of the 25 binary characteristics, and n is 190 for overall LA
evaluations, 38 for pre-9/11 LAs, 152 for post-9/11 LAs since it is the number of LAs that are available
in each category.
In order to establish an association rule of the form A → B (denoting that a characteristic implies
another), two item-sets must employ three thresholds to pass: support, confidence, and lift. The support
of A is defined as the fraction of all transactions involving A, and the support of B is similarly defined.
In the LA setting, the support threshold checks if these characteristics, are one-by-one frequent enough
so that we can generalize these characteristics. If the support exceeds a predetermined threshold, then
the itemsets are assumed to be frequent enough.
If A and B are frequent enough, then the test for A→ B is subjected to a confidence test. Confidence
is the fraction of the transactions where A and B are together in the transactions that involve B. In the
LA setting, the confidence is the fraction of number of LAs who also have the characteristic A among LAs
who have the characteristic B. If the confidence exceeds a predetermined threshold, then coincidentally
or not, A implies B.
Another measure, lift , which is also called the interestingness factor, controls if this implication is
coincidental. It compares the number of transactions that A and B are together to the multiplication of
the number of transactions that A and B exist marginally. If the number of transactions that A and B
are together is higher, then the implication is not coincidental, and A→ B.
Another interestingness measure is cohesion which is a substitute for lift. It uses the entropy concept
that measures the disorder or uncertainty in data. While lift controls if A and B together frequent
enough for the rule A → B, entropy controls whether A is not frequent enough in the absence of B.
Then, cohesion is calculated as an inverse measure of entropy. If the cohesion exceeds a predetermined
threshold, it can be concluded that A implies B. We refer the readers to Appendix A.1 for mathematical
details.
3.2 Parameter Selection
We define a strong association rule or a strong implication as rules with a minimum support threshold of
20% and a minimum confidence threshold of 70%. A two-way association rule or a two-way implication
is the case where X → Y and Y → X, and it is denoted by X ↔ Y . A strong two-way association rule
or a strong two-way implication where both X → Y and Y → X exceed a minimum support threshold
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of 20% and a minimum confidence threshold of 70%. It should be noted that the literature on A-priori
association rules mostly implement a minimum support threshold level of 10-15% [37, 38]. However, LA
events are rare, making LA data a small dataset. 10-20% of the data refers to a number that is insufficient
for generalization. Hence, the minimum support threshold is increased to 50%. If the support threshold
is too low, the emerging characters will be in small numbers that will prevent generalization. If it is too
high, then some associations will be lost by dropping important characters due to a high filter rate. The
minimum support and minimum confidence threshold values are determined by tuning in a way that
provides both sufficient number of data and emergence of important association rules.
The A-priori algorithm parameters (support and confidence) aim to balance generating non-significant
association rules (type 1 error) and not missing significant ones (type 2 error) [39]. In our case, the
minimum confidence threshold is 0.7 which is a relatively low value. Such a confidence level avoids
missing significant rules, at the expense of producing non-significant ones. Once a rule is constructed in
the form of A→ B, it requires a further statistical test to determine the significance of a rule. This test
has the null hypothesis that A and B are independent. In order to check independence, the number of
occurences of A and B are compared to the expected number of occurences when they are independent.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then a proof for the associations have been found. We refer the readers
to Appendix A.1 for mathematical details.
3.3 Chain Rules (R-Rules)
An R-rule, also known as a rule of rules, is a hyper-rule in the form (A→ B)→ (C → D). An association
chain (implication chain) is a special type of R-rules in the form (A → B) → (B → ...) → (... → C)
or A → B → ... → C. In other words, an association chain is a statistically significant aggregation of
association rules in the form of A→ B → ...→ C.
The statistical significance of an R-rule is measured by cohesion [40]. While the item-wise cohesion
measure checks whether A does not occur frequently enough without B, the rule-wise cohesion measure
uses the cohesion for if A → B, B → C, and A → C holds. We refer the readers to Appendix A.2 for
mathematical details.
4 Association Rules for LA Behavior
The following subsections present the outputs of the A-priori algorithm results. In Section ??, we provide
the A-priori algorithm results for all 190 LAs in the database, and Section ?? compare pre- and post-9/11
LAs, and displays the temporal change in LA characteristics. Bakker and de Graaf [8] conclude that
LAs yield more common characteristics when analyzed by their ideologies. Referring to this study, in
Section ??, we analyze LAs according to their ideological motivations. We also compare these results to
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incident-scene-based classification (Section ??) and behavior-based classification (Section ??).
4.1 Overall evaluations
Analyzing 190 LAs over 60 years, we have found the following most common characteristics:
• 62.1% of all LAs required a triggering event,
• 62.1% of all LAs targeted civilians,
• 59.5% of all LAs committed their attacks using firearms,
• 52.1% of LAs had no prior connections to extremist/terrorist people,
• 51.0% of LA attacks were fatal.
The overall analysis of 190 LAs produce few common characteristics and none them belong to the
early behavior stage. Hence, these common characteristics are not viable in capturing the early signs of
an LA. Figure 2 displays the associations among common characteristics found by the A-priori algorithm.
These results are:
• One strong two-way association emerges: the usage of firearms imply fatalities, and vice versa.
• Only two strong one-way associations are available for all LAs.
– Usage of firearms implies a triggering event.
– Fatalities imply civilian targets.
Even though some commonalities can be identified, the face of LAs have changed significantly through
time. To capture these changes, we will first compare pre-9/11 LAs to post-9/11 LAs.
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Figure 2: Associations for all LAs. For this figure and all forthcoming figures for associations, the color of
each cell indicates the confidence level of the association. The color white indicates three possibilities: i) the
confidence of the rule is less than 0.5, ii) the confidence of the rule is greater than 0.5 but the lift is less than
1, therefore, the associations are coincidental, and iii) at least one item is not frequent enough to construct
an association. The shades of gray indicate the magnitude of the confidence, where darker shades specify a
stronger association.
4.2 Comparison of Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 LAs
Analyzing all LAs has yielded sparse relationships as shown in the previous section. One reason for this
sparsity is that the triggers, technologies, opportunities, and other conditions that lead an LA to an
attack has changed significantly over the years. Hence, in this subsection, we present the associations for
pre-9/11 and post-9/11 LAs in a way to show how the LA terrorism has changed. The database holds
38 LAs before 9/11 and 152 LAs after 9/11 and the A-priori algorithm was separately applied to these
two data sets. We present the figure of associations for both era in Figure 3. The density of gray-shaded
cells indicate that pre-9/11 LAs had more common characteristics than post-9/11 LAs. In the following
subsections, we delve deeper into both time periods and present the results of the A-priori algorithm
results.
16
(a) Pre-9/11 LAs
(b) Post-9/11 LAs
Figure 3: Associations denoting temporal change in LA behavior. Pre-9/11 LAs having more associations
than post-9/11 LAs shows that the LAs have diversified greatly in terms of behavior and characteristics.
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4.2.1 Associations in the pre-9/11 era
We have found the following most common characteristics
• 81.6% of the pre-9/11 LAs used firearms in their attacks.
• 76.3% of the pre-9/11 LA attacks were fatal.
• 68.3% of the pre-9/11 LAs had a triggering event that led to attack idea.
• 65.8% of the LAs leaked intent offline.
• 65.8% of the LAs were not self-radicalized.
• 63.2% of the LAs had prior contacts with extremist or terrorist groups.
The algorithm produces eight strong two-way associations:
• The existence of a triggering event implies the usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies not being self-radicalized, and vice versa.
• The existence of a triggering event implies offline leakage, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies a trigger event, and vice versa.
• The existence of a triggering event implies offline leakage, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Civilian targets imply fatalities, and vice versa.
• Usage of firearms implies fatalities, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations are:
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups are implied by being able to escape from the
crime scene.
• The existence of a triggering event and the usage of firearms are implied by any of the follow-
ing: having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, offline leakage, targeting a person who
symbolizes an enemy ideology, being able to escape from the crime scene.
• Offline leakage is implied by targeting a person who symbolizes an enemy ideology.
• Fatalities are implied by having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, offline leakage, target-
ing civilians or a person who symbolizes an enemy ideology, being able to escape from the crime
scene.
4.2.2 Associations in the post-9/11 era
In this era, the LA attack types and modi operandi have diverged, and as a result there is only one
common characteristic
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• 60.5% of the LAs had a triggering event that led to the attack idea.
Interestingly, no strong two-way associations are obtained for this time period and as can be seen from
Figure 3b, only one strong one-way association exists for post-9/11 LAs:
• The usage of firearms implies a triggering event.
Comparison of Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 LAs.
The common characteristics and the associations show that pre-9/11 LAs had more connections to
extremist/terrorist people or groups than post-9/11 LAs. This indicates that while violence once was a
means chosen by extremist-adjacent people, it has now trickled down to emerge as an option even for
people without any radical connections. This result also holds for formal weaponry training (military or
otherwise). While pre-9/11 LAs had a rate of 47% in formal weaponry training, this characteristic applies
to 22% of post-9/11 LAs, indicating that terrorism has spread into the realm of ordinary civilians more
and more. Furthermore, LA terrorism has become more diverse in preparatory behaviors. While both pre-
and post-9/11 LAs target civilians more, the rate of other groups has significantly risen. Targeting the
law enforcement and government officials has increased from 13% to 29%. Similarly, weapon selection
has also changed significantly. The usage of firearms has dropped from 89% to 53%. Post-9/11 LAs
weapon choices vary from explosives to hatchets, machetes, as well as to public or personal vehicles.
The variety in target and weapon selection has led to varieties in the aftermath of the attack. While
pre-9/11 attacks had a higher fatal attack rate (76%), post-9/11 LAs commit less attacks that have
fatal consequences (47%). However, the number of fatalities per attack does not exhibit statistically
significant differences. On the contrary, the standard deviation in the number of fatalities has more than
doubled for post-9/11 LAs (from 3.60 to 8.43); meaning that, while the number of unsuccessful attacks
has increased due to sting operations or improved technology, post-9/11 LAs have caused more mass
casualty than pre-9/11 LAs. In terms of after-attack behavior, the rate of escapes significantly decreased
while the rate of suicides/killings has increased due to the technological advances. For example, in 2016,
the police killed an attacker with a remote-controlled bomb disposal robot, which was the first time that
U.S. law enforcement used a robot to subdue a terrorist [41].
4.3 Evaluations regarding attacker motivation
According to Bakker and de Graaf [8], classifying LAs into three ideological segments (jihadists, right-
wing LAs, single-issue LAs) produces numerous distinct characteristics. In our data, these three groups
hold the 88% of the post-9/11 LAs. Grouping LAs according to their ideology reveals more similarities
and stronger implications than overall comparisons. Among the 152 post-9/11 LAs, 40 are jihadist LAs,
58 are right-wing LAs, and 36 are single-issue LAs.
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4.3.1 Association Rules for Jihadist LAs
Among 40 jihadist LAs, We have found the following most common characteristics
• 67.5% of jihadist LAs do not leak the attack intent.
• 62.5% of jihadist LAs choose weapons other than firearms as the means of attack (mostly explosives).
• 70% of jihadist LAs target civilians. Together with the law enforcement targets, they make up 97%
of jihadist LAs’ targets.
• Half of the jihadist LAs are not self-radicalized and half of them do not need a triggering event for
to exhibit attack intent.
We have found only one strong two-way association:
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies not being self-radicalized, and vice versa.
We have also found one-way associations which are summarized as (Figure 4a):
• Civilian targets are implied by no fatalities after the attack or no intent leakage.
• No injuries/fatalities after the attack are implied by being arrested at the crime scene.
• Being arrested at the crime scene is implied by not being self-radicalized.
4.3.2 Association Rules for Right-Wing LAs
Among 58 post-9/11 right-wing LAs, we have found the following most common characteristics
• 84.4% of the right-wing LAs target civilians.
• 70.7% of the right-wing LAs require a triggering event for the attack intent.
No strong two-way associations emerges among these LAs and we only find the following strong one-way
associations which are (Figure 4b):
• Civilian targets are implied by not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• A triggering event is implied by either not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups or
usage of firearms.
4.3.3 Association Rules for Single-Issue LAs
Among 36 post-9/11 single-issue LAs, we have found the following most common characteristics
• 72.2% of these single-issue LAs have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups or people.
• 61.1% of these LAs require a traumatic triggering event to intend the attack.
Only one strong two-way association emerges:
• Usage of firearms implies law enforcement/government official targets, and vice versa.
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Only two strong one-way associations emerge (Figure 4c):
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups is implied by either law enforcement/government
official targets or usage of firearms.
• Law enforcement/government official targets also imply the existence of a trigger event or no intent
leakage.
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(a) Post-9/11 Jihadist LAs
(b) Post-9/11 Right-Wing LAs
(c) Post-9/11 Single-Issue LAs
Figure 4: Associations by ideological motivations. Even though each ideological class has distinctive de-
mographic distinctive characters as given in [5, 8, 42], this classification adds very little to the post-9/11
associations and the A-priori algorithm does not find many associations.
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4.4 Evaluations regarding incident-scene behavior
Given that ideological classification has not provided distinct behavioral results, another perspective for
behavior analysis becomes necessary. Such a classification also allows us to evaluate the reflection of
incident-scene behavior in early, preparation, and after-attack behaviors. Out of 152 post-9/11 LAs, 54
of them are maximum damagers, 37 are symbolic attackers, 27 are daredevils, 27 are attention seekers,
and 7 are stallers. The characteristics of each type are presented in Table 3. Since the number of data for
stallers are statistically insufficient for analysis, we will focus on the other four groups for associations.
Table 3: Class comparisons for incident-scene behavior.
4.4.1 Association Rules for Maximum Damagers
Among 58 post-9/11 maximum-damager LAs, we have found two common characteristics:
• 92.5% of the maximum damagers target civilians.
• 61.1% of the maximum damagers attacks are fatal.
One strong two-way associations emerges:
• The usage of firearms implies fatalities, and vice versa.
We have found the following strong one-way associations (Figure 5a):
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies civilian targets and fatalities.
• A triggering event involves fatalities.
• The usage of other weapons implies civilians.
4.4.2 Association Rules for Symbolic Attackers
Among 37 post-9/11 symbolic-attacker LAs, we have found four common characteristics:
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• 72.9% of the symbolic attackers use other weapons than firearms.
• 70.3% of their attacks end up with no injuries or fatalities.
• 67.5% of symbolic attackers do not have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 64.5% of symbolic attackers require a triggering event for the attack intent.
We have found two strong two-way associations among symbolic attackers:
• Self-radicalization implies no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies no casualties, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations found by the A-priori algorithm are (Figure 5b):
• No casualties are implied by the existence of a triggering event or being self-radicalized.
• A triggering event implies not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• Self-radicalization implies a trigger event.
4.4.3 Association Rules for Daredevils
Among 27 post-9/11 daredevil LAs, we have found five common characteristics:
• 88.9% of the daredevils use firearms.
• 74.1% of the daredevils require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 70.4% of the daredevils target the law enforcement or government officials.
• 70.4% of the daredevils do not leak the attack intent.
• 62.9% of their attacks are fatal.
We have found four strong two-way associations among daredevils:
• Having no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies no leakage, and vice versa.
• A triggering event implies targeting the law enforcement or government officials, and vice versa.
• A triggering event implies targeting the usage of firearms officials, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies targeting the law enforcement or government officials, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations found by the A-priori algorithm are (Figure 5c):
• Fatalities imply the usage of firearms.
• A trigger event is implied by not-being self-radicalized.
• Targeting the law enforcement or government officials is implied by either not-being self-radicalized
or fatalities after attack.
• The usage of firearms implies not being self-radicalized.
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4.4.4 Association Rules for Attention Seekers
Among 27 post-9/11 attention-seeker LAs, we have found three common characteristics:
• 67.0% of the attention seekers target civilians.
• 62.9% of their attacks end up with no injuries or fatalities.
• 62.9% of the attention seekers do not leak the attack intent.
No two-way strong associations are found for attention seekers but the following strong one-way associ-
ations are found 5d):
• Civilian targets are implied by either of the following: no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist
groups, the existence of a triggering event, or usage of other weapons than firearms.
• The existence of a triggering event is implied by either no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist
groups or usage of firearms.
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies no leakage.
• Usage of other weapons than firearms implies no casualties.
4.5 Evaluations regarding behavioral clusters
This classification method attempts to maximize common characters in behaviors. For this reason, a
clustering algorithm (K-Means algorithm) is applied to 152 post-9/11 LA data points. K-Means algorithm
requires a predetermined number of clusters. To decide the optimal number of clusters, C-Index is used
to validate the clustering results. A smaller C-Index indicates a better clustering [43]. In our trials, seven
clusters produce the smallest C-Index value. However, three of these clusters only contain outliers and
do not provide sufficient number of data for associations. Hence, we will proceed with four behavioral
clusters.
Table 4 shows the distinctive characteristics of each cluster. A triggering event appears as a char-
acteristic for three clusters, and leakage is a common characteristic for one of the clusters. Noticeable
similarities are found between the incident-scene-based and behavior-based classification (see Table 5).
More than half of the first and the third cluster is composed of maximum damagers. 55% of the LAs
in the first cluster are maximum damagers. The LAs in this cluster target civilians, use firearms, and
have high fatality rates. 61% of the fourth cluster is also composed of maximum damagers. The stories
and backgrounds of these maximum damagers show that the first cluster contains LAs with a “me vs.
them” mentality and the fourth cluster contains LAs with a “us vs. them” mentality. An LA with a
“me vs. them” mentality sees every civilian as a target; whereas, an LA with an “us vs. them” men-
tality wants to spare people with their own ideologies and only target civilians from other ideologies.
Furthermore, having a “me vs. them” mentality increases the fatality rate of attacks. An interesting
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result is that most “us vs. them” maximum damagers have prior contacts to extremist groups and are
not self-radicalized. 67% of the second cluster is composed of symbolic attackers and attention seekers,
who appear as self-radicalized. Slightly less than half of the third cluster is composed of daredevils.
Since their actions are not well-planned, their attacks are likely to fail and their arrest rate is high. The
second cluster shows some similarity to symbolic attackers who are the majority in the cluster compared
to other incident-scene types (48%). They are self-radicalized LAs with no prior extremist connections
and they use other weapons than firearms. Daredevils form 43% of the third cluster who target the
law enforcement and government officials with firearms. They do not leak intent because the duration
between trigger event and attack is mostly very short. The last cluster has no triggering event and do
not leak intent. Fortunately, their attacks are mostly not fatal. Associations for each cluster is presented
in the following subsection.
Table 6 shows the ideological tendencies of each cluster. While first two clusters have a majority of
right-wing terrorists, the third cluster (mostly daredevils) is very diverse in terms of ideology. Finally, the
last cluster (“us vs. them” maximum damagers) is almost equally dominated by jihadists and right-wing
terrorists.
Table 4: Cluster Comparisons.
4.5.1 Association Rules for Cluster 1
Cluster 1 contains 31 LAs. Among these LAs, the common characteristics we have found are:
Maximum
Damagers
Symbolic
Attackers
Daredevils
Attention
Seekers
Stallers
Cluster 1 55% 16% 13% 13% 3%
Cluster 2 23% 48% 6% 19% 3%
Cluster 3 9% 17% 43% 30% 0%
Cluster 4 61% 22% 0% 17% 0%
Table 5: Comparison of two clustering domains
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Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Jihadists 16.1% 19.4% 37.5% 47.8%
Right-wing 51.6% 48.4% 29.2% 43.5%
Single-issue 16.1% 19.4% 29.2% 4.3%
Table 6: Relationship between ideology-based and behavioral-based classification
• 100.0% of them target civilians.
• 96.7% of them use firearms.
• 90.3% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 87.1% of their attacks are fatal.
• 77.4% of them have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 65.4% of them commit suicide or are killed at the crime scene.
We have identified six strong two-way associations:
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• Online leakage implies committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene, and vice versa.
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies fatalities, and vice versa.
• Civilian targets imply a triggering event, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies fatalities, and vice versa.
Additionally, we have found the following strong one-way associations:
• Civilian targets are implied by either of the following: no prior criminal history, the existence of a
triggering event, online leakage, or committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene.
• Not having prior criminal history implies no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups and fatal-
ities.
• Committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene implies fatalities.
4.5.2 Association Rules for Cluster 2
Cluster 2 contains 27 LAs. Among these LAs, the common characteristics we have observed are:
• 93.6% of them have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 93.6% of them use other weapons than firearms.
• 87.1% of them are self-radicalized.
• 77.2% of them do not leak the attack intent.
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• 67.8% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 64.5% of them target civilians.
• 64.5% of their attacks have no casualties.
We have found three strong two-way associations:
• The existence of a triggering event implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• No leakage implies not having any prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• Self-radicalization implies not having any prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice
versa.
We have also found the following strong one-way associations:
• No casualties imply the existence of a triggering event, not having any prior contacts to extrem-
ist/terrorist groups, and self-radicalization.
• Not having prior criminal history implies no leakage and self-radicalization.
• Civilian targets imply no leakage and usage of other weapons than firearms.
4.5.3 Association Rules for Cluster 3
Cluster 3 contains 24 LAs. The common characteristics of these LAs are given below:
• 91.7% of them are not self-radicalized.
• 87.5% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 83.3% of them have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 79.7% of them target the law enforcement or government officials.
• 85.0% of them use firearms.
• 70.8% of them do not leak the attack intent.
• 87.0% of their attacks have no casualties.
• 87.0% of them are arrested at the crime scene.
We have found five strong two-way associations such that:
• Not being self-radicalized implies targeting the law enforcement/government officials, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies the usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies targeting the law enforcement/government
officials, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies targeting the law enforcement/government officials, and vice versa.
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We have also found the following strong one-way associations
• Being arrested after the attack implies no leakage, the usage of firearms, and targeting the law
enforcement/government officials.
4.5.4 Association Rules for Cluster 4
Cluster 4 contains 23 LAs. The common characteristics of these LAs are given below:
• 100.0% of them use other weapons than firearms.
• 87.0% of them target civilians.
• 87.0% of their attacks have no casualties.
• 87.0% of them are arrested at the crime scene.
• 73.9% of them have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 60.8% of them are not self-radicalized.
We have found seven strong two-way associations:
• Not being self-radicalized implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• Civilian targets imply having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist
groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies no casualties, and vice versa.
• The usage of weapons other than firearms implies being arrested at the incident scene, and vice
versa.
• Being arrested at the incident scene implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
We also found the following strong one-way associations:
• Having no prior criminal history implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, civilian
targets, and the usage of weapons other than firearms.
• Having no trigger event implies contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, the usage of weapons other
than firearms, and being arrested at the incident scene.
• Not being self-radicalized implies the usage of weapons other than firearms.
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5 Association Chains
In this section, we extract chain rules. A chain rule is a chain of associations that satisfy a cohesion
threshold level of 70% and an overall minimum confidence threshold level of 70% given an initial node.
Each node represents a behavior or an attack characteristic and is filled with a color code indicating
chronological occurrence. The color codes for the timeline is presented in Figure 7. Finally, two-way
arrows indicate that if the nodes on each edge of a two-way arrow are interchanged, the chain still satisfy
the minimum confidence level for that rule.
Figure 7: Timeline color codes for chain rules. The lighter shade of cells indicate an event in the further
past. The darker shades indicate closeness to an attack.
Overall evaluation of LAs and post-9/11 LAs do not produce any implication chains. However, Figure
8 presents the chains for pre-9/11 LAs. The central theme for pre-9/11 LAs is not being self-radicalized,
fatalities, and the usage of firearms. As aforementioned, while pre-9/11 LAs are relatively homogeneous,
post-9/11 LAs are very heterogeneous and do not produce any association chains. Similarly, ideological
classification has not produced any association chains, as well.
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Figure 8: Chain Rules for Pre-9/11 LAs.
Among the incident-scene behavior-based classification, maximum damagers and attention seekers do
not yield any chains. However, the chains for symbolic attackers and daredevils are given in Figure 9
and Figure 10.
Figure 9: Chain Rules for Symbolic Attackers.
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Figure 10: Chain Rules for Daredevils.
While symbolic attackers are mostly self-radicalized, their attacks do not necessarily aim to kill.
Hence, low casualties appear as the central theme. Daredevils, on the other hand, are mostly not self-
radicalized. They do not generally leak intent because their attacks are the most impulsive ones among
LAs. They either target the law enforcement face-to-face or exhibit violence at the same moment as the
trigger. Their attacks are mostly fatal.
Behavior-based classification has yielded longer and statistically more robust chains compared to other
classification schemes. The association chain for Cluster 1 is presented in Figure 11. This group involves
more ordinary people who may not be considered threatening. They have no prior criminal history or
contacts to other extremist, radical, or terrorist groups. However, after a trigger, their grievance channels
to an attack intent with the use of firearms. Consequently, fatality rate of their attacks is high. Cluster
1 is the only group that leaks intent and their leakage pattern is mostly online. Hence, they leave their
“writeprints” on the internet.
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Figure 11: Chain Rules for Cluster 1.
Figure 12 exhibits the association chain for Cluster 2. The attackers in this cluster do not usually
use firearms. They have no prior contacts to other extremist, radical, or terrorist groups, and they are
self-radicalized. They experience a triggering event similar to the ones in Cluster 1, however, unlike
Cluster 1, they do not leak intent. Moreover, they mostly target civilians.
Figure 12: Chain Rules for Cluster 2.
Figure 13 demonstrates the association chain for Cluster 3. This cluster exhibits similar behavior to
daredevils; their targets are the law enforcement or government officials, and they use firearms. They
are mostly arrested after the attack. While “no leakage” is an important characteristic of this cluster; a
trigger event is not prominent, as well.
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Figure 13: Chain Rules for Cluster 3.
Figure 14 displays the association chain for Cluster 4. The LAs in this cluster are not subjected to
a trigger event and have no prior criminal history. In contrast to Cluster 2, they have prior contacts to
other extremist, radical, or terrorist groups and they are not self-radicalized. However, similar to Cluster
2, they also choose weapons other than firearms; hence, rate of fatal attacks is low.
Figure 14: Chain Rules for Cluster 4.
6 Temporal Associations
Among behavioral characteristics, online leakage and trigger events are important and traceable mile-
stones on the pathway to an attack. In this section, we will provide statistical properties of each LA type.
The most prominent landmark is the trigger event and its timing. Some of the timings are available on
the databases. However, for most of these timings, we were able to gather information through local and
national newspaper archives. Pre-9/11 LAs are excluded in the analyses because their trigger times are
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seldom readily available online.
72 of the 99 triggering events have the exact dates. 24 attacks have the exact week, two of them
have the exact month and four of them have the exact year. In the statistical analyses, we have used
the day and the week data because month and year information assumptions largely affect the results.
The statistical properties of the duration between trigger event and the attack are given in Table 7. The
temporal deviations between triggers for each group are very high and even though the association rules
and chains hold, the temporal deviations between trigger event and attack are very large.
Number of Data Points Prominent Characteristic Mean Median Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation
Overall 93 Yes 205.7 31 419.9 2
Ideology-Based
Jihadists 24 No 150 46 320.4 2.1
Right-wing 39 Yes 205.2 18 366.8 1.8
Single-issue 20 Yes 188.5 60 370.5 2
Incident-Scene Based
Maximum Damagers 30 No 364.5 151 553.8 1.5
Symbolic Attackers 26 Yes 149.2 27 291 2
Daredevils 20 Yes 192.3 31 445.8 2.3
Attention Seekers 15 Yes 26.9 4 59.6 2.2
Behavior-Based
Group 1 26 Yes 298.7 144 388.8 1.3
Group 2 22 Yes 41.5 7 86.9 2.1
Group 3 19 Yes 173.3 17 379.6 2.2
Group 4 8 No 209.5 31 389.2 1.9
Table 7: Temporal Statistical Properties between Trigger Event and Attack
Another important landmark is the leakage but only one attacker type has leakage as a prominent
characteristic. Cluster 1 has scored high on online leakage. In this group, 20 exact leakage dates are
found and the mean between leakage and attack is 60 days with a large standard deviation of 87 days.
Despite the large standard deviation, the median of the time span between the leakage and the attack is
7 days, meaning that 50% of the LAs attack within a week after the leakage.
Intervals between the landmarks show a vast variation; all groups have high coefficient of variation
values and the duration cannot be generalized within groups. Another arising question is that if these
durations are related with the rate of fatal attacks. Non-fatal attacks have an average of 115 days with
a standard deviation of 234.7 days between the trigger and the attack; whereas fatal attacks have an
average of 141 days with a standard deviation of 234.8 days between the trigger and the attack. A
t-test comparing these groups yields a p-value of 0.63 which indicates that fatal and non-fatal attacks
do not have a significant difference between their trigger-attack durations. Another comparison between
fatal and non-fatal attacks have been made in terms of the duration between leakage and attack times.
Non-fatal attacks have an average of 44 days with a standard deviation of 53.4 days between the leakage
and the attack; whereas fatal attacks have an average of 36 days with a standard deviation of 64.2 days
between the trigger and the attack. A t-test comparing these groups yields a p-value of 0.711 which
indicates no significant difference between leakage and fatality.
Despite the large standard deviations of temporal difference between mileposts, medians provide
valuable insights. Almost 50% of the LAs attack in a month after the trigger. Even though daredevils
are more impulsive than other types, attention seekers have a much smaller median, that is, 50% of
attention seekers attack in less than 5 days after the trigger. Likely, 50% of Group 2 (mostly consists of
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symbolic attackers and attention seekers) attacks in less than a week after the trigger. One important
remark is maximum damagers have longer duration than any other group; hence, it can be argued that
high fatality rate requires high attack preparation time.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The face of terrorism has dramatically changed, especially over the last two decades. The number
of attacks by individuals have been more frequent than ever, making LA terrorism one of the most
accelerating man-made threats, especially in the US. As a result, there is a need for academic work
to understand LA behavior and characteristics. While understanding LA behavior have been studied
qualitatively and quantitatively, the associations and connections between those behavioral characteristics
have not been analyzed in a temporal manner for an attempt to intervene at the right time.
In this study, distal and proximal characteristics of LAs are analyzed together with attack character-
istics and after-attack behaviors. However, the term “behavior” indicates different concepts in literature.
To provide clarity on this term, we have defined four temporal behavior phases: early behavior, prepara-
tory behavior, incident-scene behavior, and after attack behavior. Using 25 binary characteristics, we
first compare pre- and post-9/11 LAs. The results indicate that while pre-9/11 LAs had prior contacts
to extremist/radical groups and mostly radicalized by the people in their environment, post-9/11 LAs
are more diverse. The most noticeable change we have found is that LA terrorism has trickled down to
people that do not have prior connections, and the weapon of choice has diverged greatly.
Additionally, besides ideological classification, we introduce two new classifications of LAs: incident-
scene-based and behavior-based classification. Incident-scene-based classification is achieved through the
data obtained with the game developed in the GRIST Lab and behavior-based classification is obtained
through the clustering of 25 binary characteristics. The incident-scene-based data provides five types of
attackers: maximum damagers, symbolic attackers, daredevils, attention seekers, and stallers. Behavior-
based classification further divides maximum damagers to “me vs. them” and “us vs. them” types.
Through behavior-based classification, we are able understand the evolution process of an LA attacker
by producing association chains.
Triggering event and leakage are traceable characteristics if they have online “writeprints”. Hence,
our further analysis evaluates if these landmarks differ according to the LA type. However, the durations
between triggering event and attack, or the durations between leakage and attack have high standard
deviations for each LA type. Moreover, these durations do not have a statistically significant effect on
the fatal attack rates. Hence, further analysis is required for connecting behavior to attack timeline.
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Appendices
A Mathematical Interpretation of the A-priori Algorithm
Let S be a set of d items, i.e. S = si : i = 1, 2, . . . , d, and T be a set of n transactions in a database,
i.e. T = ti : i = 1, 2, . . . , n. An association rule is of the form A → B where A and B are mutually
exclusive subsets of S. The width (w) of jth transaction is defined as the number of items in the related
transaction, that is,
wj =
d∑
i=1
1{si ∈ Tj}, (1)
with 1{·} denoting the indicator function of the event defined in the parentheses, i.e.
1{si ∈ Tj} =

1 if si ∈ Tj
0, otherwise.
The calculation of support for an itemset A is defined as
σA =
∑n
j=1
∏
si∈A 1{si ∈ Tj}
n
. (2)
Note that this is the fraction of transactions that demonstrate all the characteristics of itemset A. If the
frequency ratio of itemset A surpasses a given threshold, the itemset is considered to be frequent enough
to be a candidate for an association generalization.
Association rules are constructed through mutually exclusive subsets of frequent itemsets. For a
frequent itemset A, an association rule is of the form X → Y where X ∪ Y = A and X ∩ Y = ∅, that
is, the rules are constructed among all nonempty mutually exclusive subsets of A. For the association
rule of the form X → Y, the confidence (γXY) of a rule defines the frequency that, given a transaction
contains the items in Y, the transaction also contains the items in X , and it is given as in Eq. 3. A rule
should hold at a certain confidence threshold.
γXY =
∑n
j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} · 1{Y ∈ Tj}∑n
j=1 1{Y ∈ Tj}
. (3)
The lift (λXY), also called interestingness factor, is defined as a test measure that the posterior
probability of the associations is higher than the prior probability (Eq. 4). A lift value higher than 1
indicates a strong dependence.
λXY =
σXY
σX · σY =
∑n
j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} · 1{Y ∈ Tj}∑n
j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} ·
∑n
j=1 1{Y ∈ Tj}
. (4)
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A.1 Statistical Significance of Association Rules
For a rule X → Y, this test uses normal approximation of binomial distribution. The support of X
(σX ) and the support of Y (σY) signify the probability of X and Y appearing in a random transaction,
respectively. If X and Y are independent, X ∪ Y occurs in a transaction with probability σXσY . The
number of rows that contain X or Y is a binomial random variable. Then, given the transaction size of
n, the number of transactions that contain X ∪ Y is nσXσY where the variance is nσXσY(1 − σXσY).
With Chebyshev’s inequality and the normal approximation to the binomial distribution, we test the
hypothesis that X and Y are independent using the following formula:
P
(
−K ≤
∑n
j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} · 1{Y ∈ Tj} − nσXσY√
nσXσY(1− σXσY)
≤ K
)
≥ 1− 1
K2
. (5)
In this formula, K ≤ 2, refers to the significance level of p = 0.05. For testing multiple rules, we
apply the Bonferroni adjustment. If m rules are tested, then
√
(m)K must be used instead of K for the
same significance level.
A.2 Association Rule Chains and R-Rules
Let R be an association chain of the form R′ → R′′, where R′ is the set of left-hand sides and R′′ is the set
of right-hand sides of every rule involved in the chain. For example, the association chain X → Y → Z
can be rewritten as (X → Y) → (Y → Z) . Hence, for this rule R′ = X ,Y and R′′ = Y,Z. Then, the
cohesion of any association chain R is defined as
c(R) =
(
c(R′) · c(R′′) ·
∏
ai∈R′,aj∈R′′
c(ai, aj)
)
, (6)
with
c(R′) =
∏
i=1,...,r−1;j=i+1,...,r
c(ai, aj), ai, aj ∈ R′, (7)
and
c(R′′) =
∏
i=1,...,r−1;j=i+1,...,r
c(ai, aj), ai, aj ∈ R′′. (8)
Here, r is the number of rules in the association, ai and aj are elements of sets R,R
′ and R′′, c(R′)
and c(R′′) are the cohesion value of the rules in sets R′ and R′′. The minimum coherence threshold
is predetermined as 0.7, similar to the confidence value. As an additional robustness criterion for an
association chain of the form X → Y → Z, a minimum confidence threshold of 0.7 for P (Y Z|X) is also
employed.
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